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Abstract
Secure Search is the problem of retrieving from a database table (or any unsorted array) the records
matching specified attributes, as in SQL SELECT queries, but where the database and the query are
encrypted. Secure search has been the leading example for practical applications of Fully Homomorphic
Encryption (FHE) starting in Gentry’s seminal work; however, to the best of our knowledge all state-of-
the-art secure search algorithms to date are realized by a polynomial of degree Ω(m) for m the number
of records, which is typically too slow in practice even for moderate size m.
In this work we present the first algorithm for secure search that is realized by a polynomial of degree
polynomial in logm. We implemented our algorithm in an open source library based on HELib imple-
mentation for the Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanthan’s FHE scheme, and ran experiments on Amazon’s
EC2 cloud. Our experiments show that we can retrieve the first match in a database of millions of
entries in less than an hour using a single machine; the time reduced almost linearly with the number of
machines.
Our result utilizes a new paradigm of employing coresets and sketches, which are modern data summa-
rization techniques common in computational geometry and machine learning, for efficiency enhancement
for homomorphic encryption. As a central tool we design a novel sketch that returns the first positive
entry in a (not necessarily sparse) array; this sketch may be of independent interest.
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1 Introduction
Storage and computation are rapidly becoming a commodity with an increasing trend of organizations and
individuals (client) to outsource storage and computation to large third-party systems often called “the
cloud” (server). Usually this requires the client to reveal its private records to the server so that the server
would be able to run the computations for the client. With e-mail, medical, financial and other personal
information transferring to the cloud, it is paramount to guarantee privacy on top of data availability while
keeping the correctness of the computations.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) [Gen09a, Gen09b] is an encryption scheme with the special
property of enabling computing on the encrypted data, while simultaneously protecting its secrecy; see
a survey in [HS14]. Specifically, FHE allows computing any algorithm on encrypted input (ciphertexts),
with no decryption or access to the secret key that would compromise secrecy, yet succeeding in returning
the encryption of the desired outcome. Furthermore, the computation is non-interactive and with low
communication: the client only sends (encrypted) input x and a pointer to a function f and receives the
(encrypted) output y = f(x), where the computation is done on the server’s side, requiring no further
interaction with the client.
The main challenge for designing algorithms that run on data encrypted with FHE is to present their
computation as a low degree polynomial f , so that on inputs x the algorithm’s output is f(x) (see examples
in [NLV11, GLN13, LLAN14, YSK+15, CKL15, LKS16, DGBL+16]). Otherwise, a naive conversion of an
algorithm for its FHE version might yield highly impractical result.
Secure search has been the hallmark example for useful FHE applications and the lead example in
Gentry’s PhD dissertation [Gen09a]. Here, the goal of the client is to search for an entry in an unsorted
array, based on a lookup value. In the secure version, the server gets access only to encrypted versions for
both the array and the lookup value, and returns an encrypted version of the index of the desired entry; see
formal Definition 2.1.
Use case examples include secure search for a document matching a retrieval query in a corpus of sensitive
documents, such as private emails, classified military documents, or sensitive corporate documents (here each
array entry corresponds to a document specified by its list of words or more sophisticated indexing methods,
and the lookup value is the retrieval query). Another example is a secure SQL search query in a database,
e.g., searching for a patient’s record in a medical database based on desired attributes (here the array
correspond to database columns, and the lookup value specifies the desired attributes).
Nevertheless, despite the centrality of the secure search application, little progress has been made in
making secure search feasible in practice, except for the settings where: (i) either there are only very few
records in the database so that the server can return the entire indicator vector indicating for each entry
whether or not it is a match for the lookup value [CKL15, YSK+15] or (ii) the lookup value is guaranteed to
have a unique match in the array [DSH14, cDD+16], or (iii) for an unbounded number of matches the server
returns all matches in time is polynomial in the number of matches [AFS17b]. Clearly, this is insufficient for
the for use cases of secure search of large datasets and no a-priori unique of few matches guarantee.
1.1 Our Contribution
Our contributions in this work are as follow.
First solution to the secure search problem that is applicable to large datasets with unrestricted
number of matches. Furthermore, it is non-interactive and with low-communication to the client. This is by
suggesting a search algorithm that can be realized by a polynomial of degree that is only poly-logarithmic
in the number m of input records. Prior solutions with low degree polynomials are only for the restricted
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search settings discussed above; whereas for the unrestricted search problem, the folklore natural polynomial
has linear degree in m. See Theorem 4.8 for details.
System and experimental results for secure search. We implemented our algorithms into a system
that runs on up to 100 machines on Amazon’s EC2 cloud. Our experiments demonstrating, in support of our
analysis, that on a single computer we can answer search queries on database with millions of entries in less
than an hour. Furthermore performance scales almost linearly with the number of computers, so that we
can answer search queries of a database of billions of entries in less than an hour, using a cluster of roughly
1000 computers; See Section 6 and Figure 2.
High accuracy formulas for estimating running time that allow potential users and researchers to
estimate the practical efficiency of our system for their own cloud and databases; See Section 5 and Figure 2.
Open Source Library for Secure-Search with FHE based on HELib [HS13] is provided for the
community [AFS17a], to reproduce our experiments, to extend our results for real-world applications, and
for practitioners at industry or academy that wish to use these results for their future papers or products.
Extensions. Our solution extends to retrieving not only exact matches to the lookup value, but also approx-
imate matches with respect, say, to a Hamming/edit/Euclidean distance bound, or any generic isMatch()
algorithm; see Section 7. Our solution easily extends to returning not only the index i∗ of the first entry
in array matching the lookup value `, but also its content array(i∗) (similarly, database row i∗), e.g. by
utilizing techniques from [DSH14, cDD+16].
1.2 Novel Technique: Search Coreset and SPiRiT Sketch
Coreset is a data summarization C of a set P of items (e.g. points, vectors or database records) with
respect to a set Q of queries (e.g. models, shapes, classifiers, points, lines) and a loss function f , such that
f(P, q) is approximately the same as f(C, q) for every query q ∈ Q. The goal is to have provable bounds
for (i) the size of C (say, 1/ε), (ii) the approximation error (say, ε ∈ (0, 1)) and (iii) construction time of C
given (P,Q, f). We can then run (possibly inefficient) existing algorithms and heuristics on the small coreset
C, to obtain provably approximated solution for the optimal query (with respect to f) of the original data.
The coreset is a paradigm in the sense that its exact definition, structure and properties change from paper
to paper. Many coresets were recently suggested to solve main problems e.g. in computational geometry
(e.g. [Phi16, Cla10, BMO+11]), machine learning (e.g.[HCB16, BFL+17]), numerical algebra [W+14] and
graph theory (e.g. [CLMS13]).
New Search Coreset for Homomorphic Encryption. In this paper we suggest to solve the secure
search problem using coreset. The idea is that instead of requiring that all the computation will be done
on the server, most of the computation will be done on the server. More precisely, the server sends to
the client only a small set of encrypted indices, that we call search coreset. These coresets are small, and
communicating them to the client, decrypting them, and decoding the desired result from the coreset is fast
and require only little time on the client side. Concretely, in this work the coreset size and decoding time is
polynomial in the output size, logm, where m is the input input array size. While it is not clear whether the
search problem can be solved efficiently (i.e., via low-degree polynomials) only using the server, we prove in
this paper that efficient and secure computation of our suggested search coreset on the server side is possible.
Moreover, it reduces the existing state of the art of client computation time from exponential to polynomial
in the output size.
Unlike traditional coreset, in this paper the coresets are exact in the sense that the data reduction does
not introduce any additional error ε. Moreover, the goal is not to solve an optimization problem, but to
suggest algorithm that can be realized by a low-degree polynomial.
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Sketches can be considered as a special type of coresets, where given an n× d matrix P and a log n× n
(fat) matrix S, the result C = SP is a log n× d (“sketch”) vector. Many problems can be efficiently solved
on the short sketch C instead of the long matrix P , by designing a corresponding (sketch) matrix S. See
examples and surveys in [W+14, KNW10, CW13, LNW14]. In this paper we focus on vectors P (setting
d = 1).
SPiRiT Search Sketch is one of our main technical contribution. It is a search sketch that gets a non-
negative vector and returns the index of its first positive entry. It has independent interest beyond secure
encryption, since unlike other Group Testing sketches (e.g. [INR10]) it can be applied on non-sparse input
vectors.
To use it, the server first turns the input vector into an (encrypted) indicator binary vector whose ith
entry is 1 if and only if the ith input entry matches the desired lookup value (where a “match” is either by an
equality condition or a generic condition such as Hamming/edit/Euclidean distance bound; see Algorithms
5 and Section 7 respectively). Then the search sketch is applied on the indicator vector, and the output is
sent to the client.
This S ◦P ◦ i ◦R ◦ i ◦T sketch is a composition of a Sketch, Pairwise, Root, and Tree matrices, together
with a binary operator i(x) = isPositive(x) that returns 1 for each strictly positive entry in x, and 0 for
x = 0. The design and proof of correctness of this new sketch for non-negative reals (independent of FHE)
is described in Section 3.
SPiRiT for FHE. We observe that sketches have an important property that makes them very relevant
to FHE: they can be implemented via low-degree (linear) polynomial. In fact, the matrices of our SPiRiT
are binary and thus can be implemented as sums of subsets, without a single multiplication. Nevertheless,
a naive realization would require to apply the polynomial over a large ring p, which (mainly due to the
isPositive operator, see Lemma A.6) requires a polynomial of degree linear in the length m of the input
array.
To reduce the degree to poly-logarithmic in input array length m, in Sections 4.2 we introduce a more
involved version of SPiRiT that can be applied on small rings, but may not return the correct search result.
The server executes this version over k = (logm)O(1) rings and returns the resulting k-coreset to the client.
Using techniques such as the Chinese Remainder Theorem and a proper selection of prime ring sizes, we
prove that the client is guaranteed to decode the desired index efficiently from this coreset.
2 Problem Statement and Main Result
In this section we give a formal statement of the search problem and our main result of efficient algorithm
for secure search.
2.1 The Secure Search Problem
The goal of this paper is to solve the following search problem on encrypted input array and lookup value,
efficiently under parallel secure computation model formally defined in this section.
Denote [m] = {1, · · · ,m}; the entries of a vector array of length m ≥ 1 by array = (array(1), · · · , array(m));
and every vector is a column vector unless mentioned otherwise. Denote by JxK the encrypted value of a
vector or a matrix x (where encryption of vectors is entry-by-entry and of values represented by t digits,
e.g., binary representation, is digit-by-digit).
Definition 2.1 (Search Problem.) The goal of the search problem, given a (not necessarily sorted) array ∈
{0, · · · , r − 1}m and a lookup value ` ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1}, is to output
i∗ = min { i ∈ [m] | array(i) = `}
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Here, and in the rest of the paper we assume that the minimum of an empty set is 0.
The Secure-Search problem is the Search problem when computation is on encrypted data. That is, the
input is ciphertexts JarrayK and J`K encrypting array and ` respectively, and the output is a ciphertextJf(array, `)K encrypting the desired outcome f(array, `). Our computation model only assumes that the
encryption is by any fully (or leveled) homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme, e.g. [BGV12], Such encryption
schemes satisfy that given ciphertexts c1 = Jx1K, . . . , cn = JxnK one can evaluate polynomials f(x1, . . . , xn) on
the plaintext data x1, . . . , xn by manipulating only the ciphertexts c1, . . . , cn, and obtaining as the outcome a
ciphertext c = Jf(x1, . . . , xn)K; see [Hal17] for a survey of FHE, and open implementations of such encryptions
e.g. in HELib [HS13]. Here and throughout the paper f() is a polynomial over the finite ring Zp of integers
modulo p (see Definitions A.1,A.3), where p is a parameter chosen during encryption, called the plaintext
modulo; f(array, `) is the outcome of evaluating f() when assigning values array, ` to its undetermined
variables.
In the context of our coreset paradigm, the output y = f(array, `) is a short sketch, named, Search
Coreset, so that there is an efficient decoding algorithm to obtain from y the smallest index i∗ where
array(i∗) = `.
Definition 2.2 (Search Coreset) Let k,m ≥ 1 be a pair of integers, array ∈ Rm and ` ∈ R. A vector
y ∈ Rk is a k-search coreset for (array, `) if, given only y, we can decode (compute) the smallest index i∗ of
array that contains the lookup value `, or i∗ = 0 if there is no such index.
The usage scenario is that the server computes JyK = Jf(array, `)K while seeing encrypted values only,
whereas the client decrypts and decodes to obtain the desired outcome i∗:
Definition 2.3 (The Secure-Search Problem) Let k, m, r, array, ` and i∗ be as in Definition 2.1. The
Search problem on (array, `) is securely solved by a non-interactive protocol between a server and a client
with shared memory holding ciphertext JarrayK with plaintext modulo p if:
1. The client sends to the server encrypted lookup value J`K and the corresponding ring modulus p.
2. The server evaluates a polynomial f(array, `) over Zp using homomorphic operations to obtain a
ciphertext JyK = Jf(array, `)K of a k-search-coreset y for (array, `), and sends JyK to the client.
3. The client decrypts JyK and decodes y to obtain the smallest index i∗ where array(i∗) = `.
The server time is O(d + log s) for d, s the degree and size of the polynomial f(); see Definition A.1. The
client time is the time to decode y. The overall time is the sum of client time and server time.
More generally, the server may compute several polynomials f1(), f2(), . . .. Moreover, the polynomials
may be computed over distinct plaintext moduli p1, p2, . . ., provided that the server has ciphertexts JarrayKpj
and J`Kpj corresponding for each plaintext moduli pj. The server time in this case is O(d+ log s) for d, s the
maximum degree and size over all polynomials. We call a protocol non-interactive if the server evaluates all
polynomials in a single parallel call.
We ignored here the time it takes the client to encrypt and decrypt, because it is a property of the underlying
encryption scheme and not the search algorithm we provide. To be more precise the client time includes also
the time to encrypt ` and decrypt y, which require computing k = O(log2m) encryption/decryptions (each
for distinct plaintext moduli).
Security guarantee. The server sees only encrypted values JarrayK, J`K (and any values it computes
from them, including the output Jf(array, `)K), while having no access to a decryption-key or any secret
information. The security guaranty is therefore as provided by the underlying encryption. For the afore-
mentioned schemes, the security achieved (under standard cryptographic assumption) is that of semantic
security [GM84], which is the golden standard in cryptography, saying essentially that seeing and manipu-
lating the ciphertexts reveals no new information on the underlying plaintext data (beyond an upper bound
on the data size).
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Realization of algorithms by polynomial. For clarity of the presentation we usually do not describe
the polynomial explicitly. Instead, for each polynomial, we suggest algorithm Algm,p,..(x, y, . . .) that can be
easily implemented (“realized”) as a polynomial. The variables of the polynomial correspond to the input
of the algorithm, represented as a concatenation (x, y, . . .) of the input variables. The evaluation of the
polynomial corresponds to the output of the algorithm. Parameters such as m, p above are not part of the
input nor the output, but part of the polynomial definition itself. For example, p may be an integer so that
the sum and product operations in evaluating the polynomial are modulo p, and m may be the input length.
Algorithm Alg(· · · ) with no subscript parameters is assumed to be run on a RAM-machine (“the client”).
It may execute commands that cannot be evaluated via a low-degree polynomial. It is called non-interactive
if it makes at most a single parallel call for evaluation of polynomials (on “the server”).
2.2 Our Main Result
We aim to securely solve the search problem with overall running time poly-logarithmic in the length m of
array, similarly to the running time of binary search on a sorted (non-encrypted) array, i.e., our question is:
Can we solve the Secure Search problem in time that is poly-logarithmic in the array size?
In this paper we answer this question affirmably (see details and proof in Theorem 4.8):
Theorem 2.4 (Secure Search) There exists a non-interactive protocol that securely solves the search prob-
lem on array ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}m and ` ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}, in overall time polynomial in logm and log r.
3 First-Positive via SPiRiT Sketch
The first step in our solution to the search problem is to reduce the input array to a binary indicator whose
ith entry is 1 if and only if array(i) = `. The search problem then reduces to finding the first positive entry
in this indicator vector, as defined below.
Definition 3.1 (First positive index) Let x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ [0,∞)m be a vector of m non-negative
entries. The first positive index of x is the smallest index i∗ ∈ [m] satisfying that xi∗ > 0, or i∗ = 0 if
x = (0, . . . , 0).
The main technical result of this paper is an algorithm for computing the first positive index securely on
the server (i.e., via low-degree polynomials). For simplicity, in this section we first assume that Algorithm 1
SPiRiTm,p,r(array) runs on a RAM machine, over real numbers (ring of size p = ∞ in some sense). This
result is of independent interest, with potential applications as explained in sketch literature over reals or
group testing, e.g. to handle streaming data. In the next sections, we introduce more tools to show how to
realized the same algorithm by a low-degree polynomial over a ring of size p ≥ 1. For this implementation,
the matrices of SPiRiT remain essentially the same, but the implementation of isPositivep,t(·) for p < ∞
will be changed; see Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 1 provides a construction scheme for computing the first-positive index i∗ ∈ [m] of a non-
negative input vector array of length m. The output is the binary representation b of the desired index
minus one, i∗ − 1, when i∗ > 0, and it is b = (0, . . . , 0) when i∗ = 0. (We comment that when the output is
b = (0, . . . , 0) there is an ambiguity of whether i∗ = 1 or i∗ = 0; this is easily resolved by setting i∗ = 1 if
array(1) > 0, and i∗ = 0 otherwise). The algorithm computes the composition of operators: S◦P ◦i◦R◦i◦T .
Here, S, P,R and T are matrices (sometimes called sketch matrices), and i(·) = isPositive∞,t(·) is an
operator that gets a vector x of length t and returns (binary) indicator vector whose ith entry is 1 if and
only if x(i) 6= 0 (where t = 2m− 1 in its first use, and t = m in the second).
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Algorithm 1: SPiRiTm,p,r(array)
Parameters: Three integers m, p, r ≥ 1. In Section 3 only, we use p =∞. Later, p is the ring size.
Input: A vector array ∈ [0,∞)m whose first positive index is i∗ ≥ 1; See Definition 3.1.
Output: Binary representation b ∈ {0, 1}dlog2me of i∗ − 1.
/* See Section 3 for the definition of S, P,R, T and isPositivep,t. */
1 Set w ← T · array /* w ∈ R2m−1 */
2 Set w′ ← isPositivep,2m−1(w) /* w′ ∈ {0, 1}2m−1 */
3 Set v ← R · w′ /* v ∈ Rm */
4 Set u← isPositivep,m(v) /* u ∈ {0, 1}m */
5 Set b← (SP ) · u /* b = S ◦ P ◦ i ◦R ◦ i ◦ T (array) */
6 return b/* b ∈ {0, 1}dlog2me */
Algorithm 1 Overview. The input is a vector array of length m, and the output is the binary
representation of i∗ − 1 for i∗ > 0, and of 0 for array = (0, . . . , 0). The parameters p, r will be utilized in
later sections, where the algorithm is assumed to be realized by a polynomial (i.e., run on encrypted data
on the server): p ≥ 1 will represent the ring of the polynomial (in this section p = ∞), and r ≥ 1 will be
the maximal value in array (here r = ∞). In Line 1 the input array is right multiplied by a (2m − 1) by
m matrix T , called the tree matrix. in Line 2, the resulting vector w is replaced by an indicator vector w′
whose ith entry is 1 if and only if w(i) > 0. In Line 3, w′ is left multiplied by an m-by-(2m − 1) matrix
R, called Roots matrix. In Line 4 we convert the resulting vector v to an indicator value as before. In
Line 5, the resulting vector u is left multiplied by the dlog2me-by-m matrix SP . The matrix SP itself is a
multiplication of two matrices: a Sketch matrix S and a Pairwise matrix P .
In the rest of the section, we define the components of S, P, i, R, T for m ≥ 1 and prove the correctness
of Algorithm 1. Note that all these components are universal constants that can be computed in advance;
see Definition A.2. Without loss of generality, we assume that m is a power of 2 (otherwise we pad the input
array by zero entries).
The first matrix S is based on the following definition of a sketch matrix .
Definition 3.2 (Sketch matrix.) Let s, k ≥ 1 be integers. A binary matrix S ∈ {0, 1}k×m is called an
(s,m)-sketch matrix, if the following holds. There is an algorithm Decode that, for every vector y ∈ Rk,
returns a binary vector indicator = Decode(y) ∈ {0, 1}m if and only if y = S · indicator. The vector y ∈ Rk
is called the s-coreset of the vector indicator.
The Sketch S ∈ {0, 1}logm×m is a (1,m)-sketch matrix as in Definition 3.2. Its right multiplication by
a binary vector t = (0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ {0, 1}m which has a single (s = 1) non-zero entry in its kth
coordinate, yields the binary representation y = St ∈ {0, 1}logm of k. A (1,m)-sketch matrix S can be
easily implemented by setting each column k = {1, . . . ,m} to be the binary representation of k − 1. More
generally and for future work where we wish to search for s ≥ 2 desired indices, an (s,m)-sketch matrix
should be used. Efficient construction of an (s,m) sketch matrix for s ≥ 2 is more involved and is explained
in e.g. [INR10].
Pairwise matrix P ∈ {−1, 0, 1}m×m is a matrix whose right multiplication by a given vector u ∈ Rm
yields the vector t = Pu of pairwise differences between consecutive entries in u, i.e., t(k) = u(k)− u(k − 1)
for every k ∈ {1, · · · ,m} and t(1) = u(1). Hence, every row of P has the form (0, · · · ,−1, 1, · · · , 0). For
example, if m = 7 and u = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) then t = Pu = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0). More generally, if u is a
binary vector that represents a step function, then t has a single non-zero entry. Indeed, this is the usage of
the Pairwise sketch in SPiRiT.
The operator isPositive∞,t(·), or i(·) for short, gets as input a vector v ∈ Rt, and returns a binary vector
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u ∈ {0, 1}t where, for every k ∈ [t], we have u(k) = 0 if and only if v(k) = 0. In Section 4.1 we define
isPositivep,t(·) for every integer p ≥ 1.
To define the next matrix, we define tree representation of a vector x, based on the common array
representation of a tree as defined in [Cor09]. See Fig. 1 for a simple intuition of the tedious definitions for
the matrix T , R, and the tree representation of x.
Figure 1: The tree representation T (x) of the vector x = (0, 1, 2, · · · , 7) for m = 8 leaves. Its array representation
is the vector w = wx = (28, 6, 22, 1, 5, 9, 13, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), which is the result of scanning the rows of T from top
to bottom. The Tree matrix T has the property that wx = Tx for every x. The label of each inner node is the
sum of its children’s labels. The sum of leaves’ labels up to the i = 5th leaf from the left (labeled ’4’) is given by
v(5) = x(1) + x(2) + x(3) + x(4) + x(5) = 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10. More generally, v = vx = (0, 1, 3, 6, 10, 15, 21, 28).
The root matrix R has the property that RTx = Rw = v.
To construct sparse R, we prove that every entry of v can be computed using only O(logm) labels. For example, 2
labels for its i = 5th entry v(5) as follows. First identify all the roots (ancestors) of the i + 1 = 6th leaf: 5,9,22,28
(black in the figure). Among these ancestors, select those who are right children: labels 5 and 22 in the figure.
Finally, sum the labels over the left siblings of these selected ancestors: 4 and 6 (in green in the figure) to get the
desired sum. Indeed, v(5) = 4 + 6 = 10.
Definition 3.3 (tree/array representation) Let x = (x(1), · · · , x(m)) ∈ Rm be a vector. The tree rep-
resentation T (x) of x is the full binary tree of depth log2m, where each of its node is assigned a label as
follows. The label of the ith leftmost leaf is x(i), for every i ∈ [m]. The label of each inner node of T (x) is
defined recursively as the sum of the labels of its two children.
The array representation of x is the vector w = (w(1), · · · , w(2m− 1)) ∈ R2m−1, where w(1) is the label
in the root of T (x), and for every j ∈ [m− 1] we define w(2j), w(2j + 1) respectively to be the labels of the
left and right children of the node whose label is w(j); see Fig. 1.
In particular, the last m entries of w are the entries of x =
(
w(m), · · · , w(2m− 1)).
Roots sketch R ∈ {0, 1}m×(2m−1) is a binary matrix such that
1. Each row of R has O(logm) non-zero entries.
2. For every tree representation w ∈ R2m−1 of a vector x ∈ Rm we have that v = Rw ∈ Rm satisfies for
every j ∈ [m] that v(j) is the sum of entries x(1), x(2), . . . , x(j) of x, i.e., v(j) = ∑jk=1 x(k).
In particular, and for our main applications, if x is non-negative, then v(j) = 0 if and only if x(1) = x(2) =
· · · = x(j) = 0. That is, v(j) tells whether j is equal-to or larger-than the index of the first positive entry in
x. Below is our implementation of the matrix R, which also explains its name.
Implementation for the Roots matrix R Let x ∈ [0,∞)m and w ∈ R2m−1 be its tree representation.
We need to design a row-sparse matrix R such that if v = Rw then v(j) =
∑j
k=1 x(k). Our main observation
for implementing such a row-sparse matrix R is that v(j) can be computed by summing over only O(logm)
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labels in the tree T (x); specifically, the sum is over the labels of the set SiblingsT (j+ 1) of left-siblings of the
ancestors (roots) of the (j + 1)th leaf; see Fig. 1. By letting Siblings(j + 1) denote the corresponding indices
of this set in the tree representation w = Tx of x, we have
v(j) =
∑
k∈Siblings(j+1)
w(k)
This equality holds because the left-siblings in SiblingsT (j+1) partition the leaves x(1), . . . , x(j) into disjoint
sets (with a set for each left-sibling), so the sum over each of these sets is the value of the corresponding
labels in w.
The indices of these left-siblings is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3.4 (Ancestors,Siblings) Let x = (x(1), · · · , x(m)) ∈ Rm, and T = T (x) be the tree-representation
of x. Consider the jth leftmost leaf in T for j ∈ [m]. We define AncestorsT (j) to be the set of ancestors nodes
of this leaf. We denote by SiblingsT (j) the union of left-sibling nodes over each ancestor in AncestorsT (j)
who is a right-sibling of its parent node. Let w ∈ R2m−1 be the array representation of T . We denote by
Ancestors(j),Siblings(j) ⊆ [2m− 1] the set of indices in w that correspond to AncestorsT (j), and SiblingsT (j)
respectively.
From the above discussion we conclude the following implementation of R satisfies the definition for the
Roots sketch matrix.
Lemma 3.5 (Roots sketch) Let R ∈ {0, 1}m×(2m−1) such that for every j ∈ [m] and ` ∈ [2m − 1] its
entry in the jth row and `th column is R(j, `) = 1 if ` ∈ Siblings(j + 1), and R(j, `) = 0 otherwise; see
Definition 3.4 and Fig. 3.3. Then R is a Roots sketch matrix as defined above.
The Tree matrix T ∈ {0, 1}(2m−1)×m is a binary matrix that, after right multiplication by a vector
x ∈ Rm, returns its tree representation w ∈ R2m−1; see Definition 3.3. The value w(i) is a linear combination
of entries in x, specifically, the sum of the labels in the leaves of the sub-tree that is rooted in the inner node
corresponding to w(i). Hence, such a matrix T that satisfies w = Tx can be constructed by letting each row
of T corresponds to a node u in T (x), and has 1 in every column j so that u is the the ancestor of the jth
leaf. Note that this unique matrix T can be constructed obliviously and is independent of x.
Theorem 3.6 (First-positive over non-negative reals) Let r,m ≥ 1 be integers, and array ∈ [0,∞)m
be a non-negative vector. Let y be the output of a call to SPiRiTm,∞,r(array); see Algorithm 1. Then y is
the binary representation of the first positive index of array. See Definitions 2.2 and 3.1.
Proof. Proof appears in Appendix B. uunionsq
4 Secure Search
In this section we use the result of the previous section to compute a k-search coreset for a given vector
array ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1}m via polynomials of low-degree.
4.1 Secure SPiRiT
To run SPiRiT over low-degree polynomials we implement isPositivep,t from the previous section via a
polynomial over a ring of size p <∞; see Appendix A.5.
Using this implementation of isPositivep,t(x), we can realize SPiRiT in Algorithm 1 via a polynomial of
degree (p− 1)2 over a ring Zp. Since we aim for degree (logm)O(1)  m, we take p = (logm)O(1). However,
for such small p, the correctness of SPiRiT no longer holds (e.g., since summing m positive integers modulo
p may result in 0 over such a small modulus p). Fortunately, we can still prove correctness under the
condition specified in Lemma 4.2 below. In the next sections we design algorithms that ensure this condition
is satisfied.
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Definition 4.1 (A-correct) Let A be a set of integers. An integer p ≥ 1 is A-correct if for every a ∈ A
we have a = 0 if-and-only-if (a mod p) = 0.
Lemma 4.2 (Sufficient condition for success of SPiRiTm,p,r.) Let m, p, r ≥ 1 be integers, array ∈
{0, · · · , r − 1}m a vector whose first positive index is i∗ ∈ [m]∪{0}, and A = { (T · array)(j) | j ∈ Ancestors(i∗)}
for Ancestors(·) and the Tree matrix T as defined in Section 3. If p is A-correct, then the output b returned
from SPiRiTm,p,r(array) (see Algorithm 1) is the binary representation of i
∗ − 1 (and b = 0logm if i∗ = 0).
Moreover, SPiRiTm,p,r(array) can be realized by a non-interactive parallel call to logm polynomials (one
for each output bit), each of log-size O(logm) and degree O(p2).
Proof. Fix i∗ ∈ [m] (the case i∗ = 0 is trivial, details omitted). We first show that if p is A-correct then
SPiRiTm,p,r returns the binary representation b
∗ of i∗ − 1. Denote x = array; and denote by ip(), iR() the
isPositive operators used in SPiRiTm,p,r and SPiRiTm,∞,r respectively. Namely, these operators, given
an integer vector map its entries to binary values, where ip() maps to 0 all multiples of p, and iR maps to 0
only on the real number zero. Let
u(j) = ip(R(ip(Tx mod p)) mod p)(j) = ip
 ∑
k∈Siblings(j+1)
(ip(Tx mod p))
 (j)
(where the last equality is by construction of R). We show below that for all j ∈ [m], the following holds:
• if j < i∗, then u(j) = 0 (see Claim 4.3); and
• if j ≥ i∗ and p is A-correct for A = Ancestors(i∗), then u(j) = 1 (see Claim 4.4).
This implies (by Claim 4.5) that a call to SPiRiTm,p,r(x) returns the binary representation b
∗ of i∗ − 1.
We next analyze the complexity of the polynomial f() realizing SPiRiTp,m,r. f() is the composition of
polynomials realizing the matrices (SP ), R and T , and polynomials realizing the two evaluations of the
operator ip() = isPositivep,t(), with degree and size 1 and O(m
2) for the former (where size is simply the
number of matrix entries), and p−1 and 1 for the latter. The degree of f is therefore 1 ·(p−1) ·1 ·(p−1) ·1 =
(p− 1)2, and its size O(m2 · 1 ·m2 · 1 ·m2) = O(m6) implying log-size of O(logm). (We remark that the size
bound is not tight; more accurately, we can count only the non-zero entries in the matrices.)
Claim 4.3 u(j) = 0 for all j < i∗.
Proof. Fix j < i∗. We first show that Tx(k) = 0 for all k ∈ Siblings(j + 1). For this purpose observe that
Tx(k) =
∑
i s.t. k∈Ancestors(i)
x(i) ≤
j∑
i=1
x(i),
where the equality is by definition of the tree matrix T , and the inequality follows from k ∈ Siblings(j + 1)
being an ancestor only of (a subset of) the first j leaves, and x being non-negative. The above implies that
Tx(k) = 0 because x(1) = . . . = x(j) = 0 for j smaller than the first positive index i∗. We conclude therefore
that ip((Tx mod p)(k)) = 0, and the sum of these values over all k ∈ Siblings(j + 1) is also zero:
(R(ip(Tx mod p)) mod p)(j) =
∑
k∈Siblings(j+1)
(ip(Tx mod p))(k) = 0.
implying that u(j) = ip(R(ip(Tx mod p)) mod p)(j) = 0. uunionsq
Claim 4.4 Suppose p is A-correct for the set A = Ancestors(i∗). Then u(j) = 1 for all j ≥ i∗.
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Proof. Fix j ≥ i∗. The key observation is that the intersection Ancestors(i∗) and Siblings(j+1) is non-empty:
∃k∗ ∈ Ancestors(i∗)
⋂
Siblings(j + 1).
The above holds because the left and right children vL, vR of the deepest common ancestor of i
∗ and j + 1
must be the parents of i∗ and j + 1 respectively (because i∗ < j + 1), implying that vL is both an ancestor
of i∗ and a left-sibling of the ancestor vR of j + 1. Namely, vL is in the intersection of Ancestors(i∗) and
Siblings(j + 1). Now, since k∗ ∈ Ancestors(i∗) = A then,
Tx(k∗) =
∑
j s.t. k∗∈Ancestors(j)
x(j) ≥ x(i∗) ≥ 1,
implying by A-correctness of p that,
(ip(Tx mod p))(k
∗) = 1.
Therefore, since k∗ ∈ Siblings(j + 1), we have the lower bound:
(R(ip(Tx mod p)))(j) =
∑
k∈Siblings(j+1)
(ip(Tx mod p))(k) ≥ (ip(Tx mod p))(k∗) = 1.
Conversely, since the above is a sum over at most |Siblings(j + 1)| ≤ logm < p bits (where the first
inequality is a bound on the depth of a binary tree with m leaves, and the second inequality follows from
the definition of Pm,s; see Definition 4.7), we have the upper bound:
(R(ip(Tx mod p)))(j) ≤ logm < p.
We conclude therefore that the above is non-zero even when reduced modulo p:
u(j) = ip(R(ip(Tx mod p)) mod p)(j) = 1.
uunionsq
Claim 4.5 Let u = (0, . . . , 0, 1 . . . , 1) a length m binary vector accepting values u(1) = . . . = u(i∗ − 1) = 0
and values u(i∗) = . . . = u(m) = 1. Then (SP · u mod p) is the binary representation of i∗ − 1.
Proof. Multiplying u by the pairwise difference matrix P ∈ {−1, 0, 1}m×m returns the binary vector t = Pu
mod p in {0, 1}m defined by t(k) = u(k)− u(k − 1) (for u(0) = 0). This vector accepts value t(i∗) = 1 and
values t(i) = 0 elsewhere. Multiplying t by the sketch S ∈ {0, 1}logm×m returns the binary vector y = St
mod p in {0, 1}logm specifying the binary representation of i∗ − 1. We conclude that (SP · u mod p) is the
binary representation of i∗ − 1. uunionsq
uunionsq
4.2 Search Coreset’s Item
As explained in Lemma 4.2, running SPiRiT on the server would yield a result that may not be the desired
first positive index of the input vector, but will serve as an item in a k-coreset for search. Moreover, in the
Search problem we are interested in the entry that consists of a given lookup value `, and not on the first
positive index. In this section we handle the latter issue.
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Algorithm 2: SearchCoresetItemm,p,r(array, `)
Parameters: Three integers m, p, r ≥ 1.
Input: A vector array ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}m and a lookup value ` ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} to search for.
Output: An item of a search coreset that is constructed in Algorithm 3; see Lemma 4.6.
/* ∀i : indicator(i) = 1 if array(i) = `, and indicator(i) = 0 otherwise */
1 indicator ← ToBinarym,p,r(array, `)/* see Algorithm 5 */
2 Set bp ← SPiRiTm,p,r(indicator) /* See Algorithm 1 */
3 return bp
Overview of Algorithm 2. For our main application the algorithm is to be run on encrypted data on
the server side (i.e., realized by a polynomial). The fixed parameters are the integers m, p, r ≥ 1, where Zp is
the ring in which all operations are computed, m is the size of the expected input array, and {0, . . . , r − 1} is
the set of possible values for each entry. The input is array of m integers in {0, · · · , r − 1} with an additional
integer ` ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} to look for in this array. The output of SearchCoresetItemm,p,r(array, `) is a
vector bp of logm bits that, under the condition on p from Lemma 4.2, represents the smallest value i
∗ − 1,
where array(i∗) = `. For example, if logm = 3, p = 10, array = (4, 2, 3, 9, 5, 4, 9, 2) and ` = 9 then i∗−1 = 3
since array(4) = 9, and the output is bp = (0, 1, 1) .
In Line 1 we construct a length m binary array indicator whose value is 1 only on the entries where
array contains the lookup value `; this is done via Algorithm 5 on the appendix. In Line 2 we return the
first such entry, using Algorithm 1, which in turn calls the SPiRiT sketch.
Lemma 4.6 (Sufficient condition for success of SearchCoresetItemm,p,r) Let m, p, r ≥ 1 be inte-
gers, array ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1}m a vector, ` ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} a lookup value, and i∗ ∈ [m] the smallest index
where array(i∗) = `. Let
A = { (T · indicator)(j) | j ∈ Ancestors(i∗)}
where indicator is the vector computed in Line 1 of Algorithms 2, and Ancestors(·) and the Tree matrix T are
as defined in Section 3. If p is A-correct, then the output bp returned from SearchCoresetItemm,p,r(array, `)
(see Algorithm 2) is the binary representation of i∗ − 1 (and bp = 0logm if ` does not appear in array).
Moreover, SearchCoresetItemm,p,r(array, `) can be realized by a non-interactive parallel call to logm
polynomials (one for each output bit), each of log-size O(logm + log r) and degree O(p2 log r).
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Lemmas 4.2 and A.5, analyzing the correctness and complexity
of SPiRiT and ToBinary respectively. uunionsq
Note that if p ≥ m + 1, then p is A-correct and bp is the desired output: the binary representation of
i∗− 1, where array(i∗) = ` is the first occurrence of ` in array. Since in this case every item a ∈ A is upper
bounded by the length m of indicator ∈ {0, 1}m, and thus a mod p = a. However, such a ring size p would
result in a polynomial of a degree that is linear in m, whereas we desire for poly-logarithmic dependency.
This is why we use k-coreset as explained in the next section.
4.3 Main Algorithm for Secure Search
In this section we present our main search algorithm that, given a vector array ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}m, and a
lookup value `, returns the first index of array that contains `. This is done by constructing a k-coreset
where k = O(log2m). We prove that the algorithm can be implemented in efficient (poly-logarithmic in m)
overall time. The coreset consists of the outputs of the same polynomial (secure algorithm that run on the
server) over different small prime rings sizes. The resulting coreset is computed via a non-interactive parallel
call from the client (RAM machine) who combines them to conclude the desired index i∗ that contains `.
The set of primes is denoted using the following definition.
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Definition 4.7 (Pm,s) For every pair of integers m, s ≥ 1, and b = dlogme we define Pm,s to be the
1 + dse · logbm smallest prime numbers that are larger than b.
Algorithm 3: SecureSearch(array, `)
Input: A vector array ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1}m and ` ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1}.
Output: The smallest index i∗ such that array(i∗) = `
or i∗ = 0 if there is no such index.
1 for each p ∈ Pm,dlogme (See Definition 4.7) do
2 bp ← SearchCoresetItemm,p,r(array, `) /* see Algorithm 2 */
3 Set ip ∈ [m] such that bp is the binary representation of ip − 1
4 Set C ← {ip}p∈Pm,logm
/* C is a k-search coreset, for k = |Pm,logm|, by the proof of Theorem 4.8 */
5 Set i∗ ← the smallest index i∗ in C such that array(i∗) = `, or i∗ = 0 if there is no such index.
6 return i∗
Overview of Algorithm 3. The algorithm runs on the client side (RAM machine) and its input is a vector
array ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}m together with a lookup value `. In Line 1, Pm,dlogme is a set of primes that can be
computed in advance. In Line 2, the algorithm makes the following single non-interactive parallel call to the
server. For every prime p ∈ Pm,dlogme, Algorithm 2 is applied and returns a binary vector bp ∈ {0, 1}logm.
We prove in Theorem 4.8 that the resulting set C of k = |Pm,dlogme| binary vectors is a k-search coreset;
see Definition 2.2. In particular, one of these vectors is the binary representation of i∗ − 1, where i∗ is the
smallest entry that contains the desired lookup value `. In Line 5 the client checks which of the coreset items
indeed contain the lookup value. The smallest of these indices is then returned as output. We remark that
if array cannot be accessed (for example, if array is maintained only on the server), we modify Algorithm 2
to return both bp and array(ip) (see details in Section 7).
The following theorem is the main result of this paper, and suggests an efficient solution for the problem
statement in Definition 2.1.
Theorem 4.8 (Secure Search in poly-logarithmic time) Let m, r ≥ 1 be integers, and array ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}m.
Let i∗ be the output returned from a call to SecureSearch(array, `); see Algorithm 3. Then
i∗ = min { i ∈ [m] | array(i) = `} .
Furthermore, Algorithm 3 can be computed in client time O(log3m) and a non-interactive parallel call to
O(log3m) polynomials, each of log-size O(logm+log r) and degree O(log4m log r). This results in an overall
time of O(log4m log r) (see Definition 2.3).
Proof. [of Theorem 4.8]
Correctness. Fix array ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}m and ` ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}. Let i∗ = min { i ∈ [m] | array(i∗) = `},
and let A = Ancestors(i∗) (see Definition 3.4). Let bp, ip, C as defined in Algorithm 3; that is, bp ←
SearchCoresetItemm,p,r(array, `) is the binary representation of ip − 1 and C = {ip}p∈Pm,logm .
We show that the set C contains desired output i∗: By Lemma 4.2, if p is A-correct (see Definition 4.1)
then bp is the binary representation of i
∗ − 1. By Lemma 4.9 since |A| ≤ logm, then there exists a p∗ ∈ P
that is A-correct. We conclude therefore that i∗ ∈ C.
Finally, observe that as C ⊆ [m], then i∗ being the smallest index in [m] for which array(i∗) = `, implies
that i∗ is also the smallest index in C satisfying that array(i∗) = ` (or i∗ = 0 if no such index exists). Thus,
the output min { i ∈ C | array(i) = `} is equal to i∗.
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Complexity. The client executing Algorithm 3 first makes a non-interactive parallel call to compute
SPiRiTp,m,r for the k =
∣∣Pm,dlogme∣∣ values p ∈ Pm,dlogme. Each such computation calls O(logm) poly-
nomials (one polynomial for each bit of bp), each of degree O(p
2 log r) and log-size O(logm + log r) (see
Lemma 4.6). Next the client runs in O(k) time to process the returned values. By Definition 4.7, k =
O(log2m/ log logm) = o(log2m); By Lemma 4.9, the magnitude of the primes p ∈ Pm,dlogme is upper
bounded by p = O(log2m). We conclude that Algorithm 3 can be computed in client time is O(k logm) =
o(log3m), and a non-interactive parallel call to compute k logm = o(log3m) polynomials, each degree
O(log4m log r) and log-size O(logm + log r). uunionsq
Lemma 4.9 below states that for every set A of size at most s, there exists a prime p∗ ∈ Pm,s so that p∗
is A-correct.
Lemma 4.9 (existential CRT sketch) For every integers m, s ≥ 1, the set Pm,s (see Definition 4.7)
satisfies the following properties.
1. For every set A ⊆ {0, . . . ,m} of size at most s, there exists p∗ ∈ Pm,s that is A-correct.
2. The magnitude of p ∈ Pm,s is upper bounded by p = O(s logm).
Proof. [of Lemma 4.9] Fix A ⊆ {0, . . . ,m} of cardinality at most s. We first prove that there exists p∗ ∈ Pm,s
that is A-correct. Recall that p∗ is A-correct if for every a ∈ A, (a mod p∗) = 0 if-and-only-if a = 0 (see
Definition 4.1). Clearly if a = 0 then (a mod p∗) = 0. Therefore, it suffices to show that if a 6= 0 then
(a mod p∗) 6= 0. Namely, it suffices to show that there exists p∗ ∈ Pm,s that divides none of the non-zero
elements a in A. Consider an element a in A. Observe that a ≤ m has at most logbm prime divisors larger
than b, and therefore, at most logbm divisors in Pm,s. Thus, the number of elements p in Pm,s so that p is
a divisor on an element a ∈ A is at most s · logbm. Now since |Pm,s| > s · logbm, then by the Pigeonhole
principle there exists p∗ ∈ Pm,s that divides none of the elements a ∈ A.
Next we bound the magnitude of the primes p in Pm,s. For this purpose recall that by the Prime Number
Theorem (see, e.g., in [HW75]) asymptotically we expect to find x/ lnx primes in the interval [1, x]. Thus, we
expect to find xln x− bln b = Ω( xln x ) primes in the interval [b, x], where the last equality holds for every b = o(x).
Assign x = t ln t for t = 1 + s logbm and b = dlogme. For sufficiently large m there are t primes larger than
b in the interval [b, t ln t], so all the primes in Pm,s are of magnitude at most p = O(t ln t) = O(s logm). uunionsq
Remark 4.10 To construct Pm,s we simply take the first t = 1 + s logbm primes larger than b. This
surely gives a set of t primes, though for small t these primes might not contained in the interval [b, t ln t].
Nonetheless, the above shows that for sufficiently large t, these primes are all of magnitude at most t ln t.
This asymptotic statement is captured by the O() notation saying that the primes in Pm,s are all of magnitude
O(t ln t).
5 Practical Search Time Estimation Formula
When we move from theory to implementation, there are few additional factors to take into account. In
this section we explain them and give a generic but simple formula for the estimated running time of our
algorithm, based on this more involved analysis. In the next section and in Fig. 2 we show that indeed the
formula quite accurately predicts the experimental results, at least for the configurations of our system that
we checked.
We assume that the search is for a lookup value in array ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1}m. Our formula for the overall
running time is then
T = n(1 + dlog2 ne) ·ADD + dlog2 re ·MUL + 2n · IsPOSITIV E , (1)
where
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Figure 2: Server’s running time (y-axis) on a single machine on Amazon’s cloud, for different database
array size (x-axis) of Secure Search (Algorithm 3) over encrypted database. Each colored curve represents
a different range r of integers. The red dots represent actual experiments, and the other curves are based
on Formula 1, which seems remarkably accurate.
• n = m
CORES · SIMD
• CORES is the number of computation machines (practically, number of core processors that work in
parallel)
• SIMD (Single Instruction Multiple Data) is the amount of integers that are packed in a single ci-
phertext. This SIMD factor is a function of the ring size p = O(log2 n) and L = log(d + log s) =
O(log2 log2 n) for d, s upper bounds on the degree and size of evaluated polynomials; in HELib, this
parameter can be read by calling EncryptedArray::size(), see [HS14].
• ADD, MUL, and IsPOSITIV E are the times for computing a single addition, multiplication, and
the isPositive command (see Algorithm 6), respectively, in the contexts of parameters p and L.
For example, in our system (see next section) on input parameters range r = 1 and m = 255, 844, 736
array entries, we have SIMD = 122 and CORES = 64 resulting in n = 32, 767 packed ciphertexts; ring size
p = 17; and measured timings of ADD = 0.123ms, MUL = 62.398ms, IsPOSITIV E = 695.690ms. See
Fig. 2 for graph of T on various m, r parameter.
Intuition behind Formula (1) Theorem 4.8 states a running time that is near-logarithmic in m. This
is due to Definition 2.3 that allows us to evaluate unbounded number of polynomials in parallel, so using m
machines we can search all the entries of the array in parallel. When using only CORES  m machines, each
machine suffers a running time slowdown by a factor of m/CORES. SIMD enables parallel computation
that admits additional parallelization factor of SIMD, and the overall slowdown for a machine is thus n as
defined above. The final time T is then the number of multiplication, additions and calls to isPositive that
are used by the SPiRiT algorithm.
Power of SPiRiT. In a first look it seems that SPiRiT uses O(m2) additions and mulitiplications, since
this is the size of its matrices S, P,R, T . However, since these are binary matrices, their multiplication by a
vector can be implemented by using only sum of subsets of items with no multiplications. Moreover, these
matrices are usually sparse. Hence, the running time T is near-linear in n for each machine, as indeed occurs
in practice; see Fig. 2.
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6 System and Experimental Results
In this section we describe the secure search system that we implemented using the algorithms in this paper.
To our knowledge, this is the first implementation of such a search system. Our system can roughly search
100 Gigabytes of data per day using a cloud of 1000 machines on Amazon EC2 cloud. As our experiments
show, the running time reduces near-linearly with the number of machines in a rate of 100 Mega bytes per
day per machine. We expect that more advanced machines would significantly improve our running times,
including existing machines on Amazon EC2 cloud that use e.g. more expensive GPUs.
The system is fully open source, and all our experiments are reproducible. We hope to extend and
improve the system in future papers together with both the theoretical and practical community.
6.1 The System
System Overview. We implemented the algorithms in this paper into a system that maintains an
encrypted database that is stored on Amazon’s AWS cloud. The system gets from the client an encrypted
lookup value ` to search for, and a column name array in a database table of length m. The encryption
is computed on the client’s side using a secret key that is unknown to the server. The client can send the
request through a web-browser, that can be run e.g. from a smart-phone or a laptop. The system then runs
our secure search algorithm on the cloud, and returns a k-search coreset for (array, `); see Definition 2.2.
The web browser then decrypts this coreset on the client’s machine and uses it to compute the smallest index
i∗ in array that contains `, where i∗ = 0 if ` is not in array. As expected by the analysis, the decoding and
decryption running time on the client side is negligible and practically all the search is done on the server’s
side (cloud). Database updates can be maintained between search calls, and support multiple users that
share the same security key.
Hardware. Our system is generic but in this section we evaluate it on Amazon’s AWS cloud. We use
one of the standard suggested grids of EC2 x1.32xlarge servers, each with 64 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2676
v3 (Haswell) cores and 1,952 GigaByte of RAM. Such cores are common in standard laptops.
Open Software and Security. The algorithms were implemented in C + +. HELib library [HS13] was
used for the FHE commands, including its usage of SIMD (Single Instruction Multiple Data) technique. The
source of our system is open under the GNU v3 license and can be found in []. Our system and all the
experiments below use a security key of 80 bits of security. This setting can be easily changed by the client.
6.2 Experimental Results
In this sub-section we describe the experiments we run on our system and explain the results.
Data. We run the system on a lookup value ` in a array of integers over two ranges: r = 2 and r = 264.
In the first case the vector was all zeroes except for a random index, and in the second case we use random
integers. As expected from the analysis, the running time of our algorithm depends on the range r and
length m of array, but not on the actual entries or the desired lookup value. This is since the server scans
all the encrypted data anyway, as it cannot tell when the lookup value was found.
The Experiment. We run our search algorithm as described in Section 4.3 for vectors (database table
columns) of different length, ranging from m = 10 to m = 100, 000, 000 = 108 entries, and for r ∈ {2, 264}
as explained above.
Results. Our experimental results for each machine on the cloud are summarized in the square points in
Fig 2 and also in Table 1. The client’s decoding time was negligible in all the experiments, so the server’s
time equals to the overall running time. For example, from the graph we can see that the on a single machine
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we can search in a single day an array of more than 250,000,000 binary entries, and an estimate of 30,000,000
entries with values between 0 and 264 − 1. We also added additional 6 curves that are based on the search
time Formula (1). As can be seen, the formula quite accurately predicts the actual running time.
Scalability The running time on each machine was almost identical (including the non-smooth steps; see
below). Finally, since the parallel computations on the machines are almost independent (“embarrassingly
parallel” [WA99]), the running time decreases linearly when we add more machines (cores) to the cloud, as
expected.
Comparison to theoretical analysis. In Theorem 4.8 we proved that that the overall running of the
search algorithm is only poly-logarithmic in m and r using a parallel call to m polynomials, i.e., a sufficiently
large cloud. Based on the linear scalability property above, for each single machine we thus expect to get
running time that is near-linear in m and r. This is indeed the case as explained in the previous paragraph.
Why the curves are not smooth? Each of the curves in Fig. 2 has 4–5 non-continuous increasing
steps. These are not artifacts or noise. They occur every time where the set P of primes, which depend on
the length m, changes; see Algorithm 3. As can be seen in the analysis, this set changes the ring size p that
are used by the SPiRiT sketch (see Algorithm 1), which in turn increases the depth of the polynomial that
realizes isPositive (see Algorithm 6), which finally increases the server running time.
These steps are predicted and explained by the search time Formula (1) via the ceiling operator over the
logs that make the time formula piecewise linear.
m (vector size) binary (sec) 64-bit (sec)
90,048 0.72 56.44
192,960 1.86 121.69
196,416 14.47 415.98
399,168 32.67 851.97
2,048,256 101.18 1,960.36
4,112,640 219.67 3,967.93
14,520,576 468.56 8,340.32
19,641,600 999.51 16,758.59
20,699,264 2,129.65 51,946.41
41,408,640 4,506.36 96,065.39
63,955,328 9,559.24
127,918,464 20,079.59
255,844,736 42,193.79
255,844,736 42,193.79
Table 1: Server’s running time of Secure Search (Algorithm 3) as measured on a single machine on Amazon’s
cloud for different database array size (left column) over encrypted database. The middle column shows the
running times in seconds for a binary input vector and the right column shows the running tmes in seconds
for a vector of 64-bit integers (r = 264).
7 Extension to Generic Search
We discuss here extensions of our results. First, our results extend to address searching for approximate
rather than exact match, or more generally, for a generic definition of what constitutes a match to the lookup
value. Second, while we assumed for simplicity that the input is given in binary representation, our results
16
extends to other representations. Finally, the output of our algorithm can include the value array(i∗) on
top of the index i∗. These extensions are discussed in the following.
Generic search. The goal of generic search is to search for a match to a lookup value ` in a (not necessarily
sorted) encrypted array, where what constitute a match is defined by an algorithm isMatch(a, b) that returns
1 if-and-only-if a, b are a match and 0 otherwise.
Definition 7.1 (Generic Search.) For isMatch(·, ·) returning binary values, on the input array ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1}m
and lookup value ` ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1}, the goal of generic search is to output
i∗ = min { i ∈ [m] | isMatch(array(i), `) = 1}
using a non-interactive algorithm.
Theorem 7.2 (Secure Generic Search) Suppose isMatch() is realized by a polynomial of degree d and
log-size s. Then there is an algorithm for the generic search problem that is computed in client time O(log3m)
and a non-interactive parallel call to O(log3m) polynomials, each of log-size O(logm + log s) and degree
O(d log4m).
Proof. The algorithm for generic search is our Algorithm 3, where the only difference is in the implemen-
tation of ToBinary where we replace the calls to isEqual with calls to isMatch. uunionsq
This may be useful, for example, in the context of bio-informatics DNA alignment problems, or, pattern-
matching problems in general, with isMatch() returning 1 on all entries array(i) whose edit-distance from
the lookup value is smaller than a user defined threshold. Similarly, the distance metric for defining the
desired matches may be the Hamming distance in the context of error-correcting-codes; the Euclidean dis-
tance for problems in computational geometry; the Root-Means-Square (RMS) for some machine-learning
problems, or any other measure of prediction-error to be minimized; etc. Our results show that if isMatch
can be computed efficient by the server, then the resulting algorithm is efficient. The former is known to
hold for metrics of interest, including the hamming and edit distance [YSK+15, CKL15].
Generic input representation. To handle input given in non binary representation, the only change
needed is in the algorithm ToBinary, where we replace isEqual with a testing equality in the given
representation. When this equality test is realized by a polynomial of degree d and size s, then the resulting
ToBinary algorithm is realized by m polynomials of degree d and size s (executed in parallel). In particular,
for native representation in ring Zp we can use for equality-testing the polynomial isZerop(a− b) of degree
d = p− 1 and size s = 2.
Returning value together with index. To return the value array(i∗) on top of the index i∗ we utilize
known techniques (e.g., from [DSH14, cDD+16]) for returning array(i) given i with a linear degree poly-
nomial. To keep the algorithm non-interactive, the search coreset items returned from Algorithm 2 include
both the binary representation b of an index i and the value array(i); in Algorithm 3 the client then outputs
both i∗ and array(i∗) (for i∗ as specified there).
8 Conclusions and Followup Work
In this work we show how to solve the secure search problem in overall time that is poly-logarithmic in the
input array size. Our techniques can be extended to securely solving further problems in overall time in the
input size, including securely returning all matching array entries [AFS17b], and for secure optimization and
learning [AFS17c] (for the former the time is polynomial also in the number of matching entries).
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A Preliminaries
In this section we specify some standard definitions and simple algorithmic tools to be used as part of our
algorithms.
A.1 Definitions and Notations
Definition A.1 (Polynomial) A polynomial is an expression that can be built from constants and symbols
called variables by means of addition, multiplication and exponentiation to a non-negative integer power.
That is, a polynomial can either be zero or can be written as the sum of a finite number of non-zero terms,
called monomials. The degree of a monomial xa11 · xa22 · . . . · xatt in variables x1, . . . , xt is the sum of powers
a1 + a2 + . . . + at.
The degree d = deg(p) of a polynomial p is the maximal degree over all its monomials. The size s = size(p)
of this polynomial is the number of its monomials. The log-size of p is log2 s, and its complexity is the sum
comp(p) = O(d + log s) of its degree and log-size.
For example, the polynomial p(x) = x2 + x+ 12 has degree deg(p) = 2, size s(p) = 3 and log-size log2 3.
Its complexity is then comp(p) = O(2 + log2 3) = O(1).
While the values x1, x2 may be based on other variables, such as an input to an algorithm, the polynomials
p1, p2, · · · in this paper are assumed to be fixed, i.e., universal constants as in the following definition.
Definition A.2 (Universal constant) A data structure or a parameter is a universal (global) constant if
it is independent of the input data. It may still depend on the size of the data.
This is somehow related to the class P/poly of poly-time algorithms that get poly-length advice, where
advice depends only on input size [LS93]. We do not need to compute a universal constant as part of our
main algorithm. Instead, we can compute it only once and, e.g., upload it to a public web-page. We can
then ignore its construction time in our main algorithm, by passing the constant as an additional input. A
universal constant may depend on the input size such as r and m, but not on the dynamic input values of
` or array. If the exact array length or range is unknown, or is a secret, we can use r and m only as upper
bounds. This is also why we measure the pre-processing time it takes to compute the required universal
constant, but do not add it to the overall running time of the algorithm itself.
As common in cryptography, the arithmetic operations in this paper are applied on a finite set of integers
in {0, · · · , p− 1}, where the modulo operator is used to keep the outcome of each operation in this set.
Such a set is formally called the Zp ring. We denote the modulo of two integers a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 1 by (a
mod b) = a − (b · ba/bc). More generally, for a vector v ∈ Rm, we define (v mod b) to be a vector in Rm
whose ith entry is v(i) mod b for every i ∈ [m].
Definition A.3 (Ring Zp) The ring Zp is the set {0, · · · , p− 1} equipped with multiplication (·) and addi-
tion (+) operations modulo p, i.e., a · b = ((a · b) mod p) and a + b = ((a + b) mod p) for every a, b ∈ Zp.
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A.2 Algorithmic Tools
In this section we present simple algorithms for the following tasks: (1) Algorithm 4 tests equality of two
bit-strings; (2) Algorithm 5, given a vector of bit-strings array and a bit-string ` to look for, returns the
indicator vector accepting 1 on all entries i where array(i) = ` and 0 otherwise; (3) Algorithm 6 given a
vector of integers returns a binary vector with each entry x mapped to 0 if x is a multiple of the underlying
ring modulus p, and 1 otherwise.
A.3 Comparison of Binary Vectors
The comparison of two numbers given by their binary representation (which can be considered as binary
vectors over Zp, not necessarily p = 2) is particularly useful and simple; see Algorithm 4 and the discussion
below.
Algorithm 4: isEqualt(a, b)
Parameters: An integer t ≥ 1
Input: Binary representations (vector) a = (a1, . . . , at) and (b1, . . . , bt) in {0, 1}t
Output: Return 1 if-and-only-if a = b, and 0 otherwise.
1 y ←∏ti=1 (1− (ai − bi)2)
2 return y
For two bits a, b ∈ {0, 1}, their squared difference (a − b)2 is 0 if-and-only-if they are equal, and it is 1
otherwise. Hence, isEqual1(a, b) = 1− (a− b)2 is a degree 2 polynomial for the equality-test, evaluating to
1 if-and-only-if a = b and 0 otherwise. For bit-strings a = (a1, . . . , at) and (b1, . . . , bt) in {0, 1}t, the equality-
test simply computes the AND of all bit-wise equality test with the degree 2t polynomial: isEqualt(a, b) =∏t
i=1
(
1− (ai − bi)2
)
. The correctness of the equality-test holds over the ring Zp for every p ≥ 2. Hence,
the polynomial that corresponds to Algorithm 4 can be over any such ring.
Lemma A.4 Let t ≥ 1 be an integer. Let a = (a1, . . . , at) and (b1, . . . , bt) be a pair of binary vectors in
{0, 1}t. Let y be the output of a call to Algorithms isEqualt(a, b); see Algorithm 4. Then y = 1 if-and-only-if
a = b, and y = 0 otherwise. Moreover, Algorithm 4 can be realized by a polynomial of degree and log-size 2t.
A.4 Reduction to Binary Vector
AlgorithmToBinary reduces a given pair of vector array ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}m and lookup value ` ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}
to the indicator vector indicator ∈ {0, 1}m indicating for each i ∈ [m] whether array(i) and ` are an exact
match. That is, indicator(i) = 1 if-and-only-if array(i) = `.
For simplicity of the presentation we assume here that the input values array(i) and ` are given in
binary representation and that we seek exact match array(i) = `. Nevertheless, ToBinary algorithm easily
extends to handle other input representations, as well as approximate search; see Section 7.
Algorithm 5: ToBinarym,r(array, `)
Parameters: Two integers m, r ≥ 1.
Input: array ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1}m, a lookup value ` ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1}
where values are given in binary representation using t = O(log r) bits.
Output: indicator ∈ {0, 1}m such that indicator(i) = 1 if array(i)) = ` and 0 otherwise.
1 for each i ∈ [m] do
2 indicator(i)← isEqualt(array(i), `) /* see Algorithm 4. */
3 return indicator
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Algorithm Overview. In Lines 1–2, for each i ∈ [m], we assign to indicator(i) the outcome of the
matching test array(i) = `. This is done via a call to Algorithm 4. The output vector indicator is returned
in Line 3.
Lemma A.5 Let m, r ≥ 1 be integers, array ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1}m and ` ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1}. Let indicator be the
output of a call to Algorithm ToBinarym,r(array, `); see Algorithm 5. Then indicator is a binary vector
of length m satisfying that for all i ∈ [m],
indicator(i) = 1 if-and-only-if array(i) = `,
and 0 otherwise. Moreover, Algorithm 5 can be realized by m independent polynomials, each of O(log r)
degree and log-size.
A.5 Positive vs. Zero Test
To run SPiRiT over low-degree polynomials, we implement isPositivep,t from Section 3 via a polynomial
over a ring of size p <∞. In particular, Algorithm 6 tests whether a given integer x in {0, . . . , p− 1} is zero
(= 0) or positive (> 0). More generally, if x is a vector of t entries, this test is applied for each entry of x.
Its correctness follows immediately from the Euler’s Theorem [HW75].
Algorithm 6: isPositivep,t(x)
Parameters: A prime integer p ≥ 2, and a positive integer t ≥ 1.
Input: A vector x ∈ {0, · · · , p− 1}t.
Output: A vector y ∈ {0, 1}t with entries y(i) = 0 if-and-only-if x(i) = 0 (1 otherwise).
1 Set y(i)← (x(i))p−1 mod p, for every i ∈ [t]
2 return y = (y(1), · · · , y(t))
Lemma A.6 Let p ≥ 2 be a prime, t ≥ 1 an integer, and x ∈ {0, · · · , p− 1}t. Let y be the output of a call
to isPositivep,t(x); see Algorithm 6. Then y ∈ {0, 1}t satisfies that for every i ∈ [t], y(i) = 0 if-and-only-if
x(i) = 0. Moreover, Algorithm 6 can be realized by a parallel call to t independent polynomials, each of degree
p− 1 and size 1, resulting in server time O(p).
B SPiRiT over R: Proof of Lemmas 3.5 and Theorem 3.6
In this section we prove Theorem 3.6 showing that SPiRiTm,∞,r(x) returns the first positive index of x. A
part of this proof is the analysis of our implementation of the roots matrix (see Claim B.3) which provides
a proof for Lemma 3.5.
Proof. [of Theorem 3.6] The proof follows immediately from the claims below showing that analysis of each
individual component of SPiRiT. Specifically, by the claims below, for every x ∈ Rm, the following holds:
• w = Tx is the tree-representation of x.
• w′ = isPositiveR,2m−1(w) satisfies that w′(k) = 1 if-and-only-if there is a leaf with non-zero key
among the leaves rooted at node (indexed by) k.
• v = Rw′ ∈ Rm satisfies that: (i) v ∈ {0, . . . , d}m for d = O(logm) the depth of the tree representation
of x, and (ii) v(j) = 0 if-and-only-if
∑j
i=0 x(i) = 0. Moreover, (iii) the rows of R are d-sparse (i.e.,
each row has at most d non-zero entries).
• u = isPositiveR,m(v) ∈ {0, 1}m represents a step-function (0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1) whose first 1 value is at
entry i∗, for i∗ the first positive entry of x.
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• Pu ∈ {0, 1}m has a single non-zero entry at i∗.
• St ∈ {0, 1}logm is the binary representation of the index i∗ for the unique non-zero entry in t.
We conclude therefore that output b = SPiRiT · x is the binary representation of the first positive entry in
x, as required. uunionsq
Claim B.1 (Tree Matrix T ∈ {0, 1}(2m−1)×m) For every x ∈ Rm, Tx ∈ R2m−1 is the tree-representation
of x (see Definition 3.3).
Proof. The Tree Matrix T ∈ {0, 1}(2m−1)×m: Fix x ∈ Rm, and a row k in T . The kth row corresponds to a
node u in the tree representation and is the indicator vector for the leaves rooted at u, thus the inner product
of this row with vector x gives the sum of keys over the leaves rooted at u. Namely, w = Tx ∈ R2m−1 is the
tree-representation of x. uunionsq
Claim B.2 (isPositive operator on Tx) For every x ∈ Rm and w = Tx ∈ R2m−1, w′ = isPositiveR,2m−1(w) ∈
{0, 1}2m−1 satisfies that w′(k) = 1 if-and-only-if there is a leaf with non-zero key among the leaves rooted at
node (indexed by) k.
Proof. The isPositiveR,2m−1 operator applied on Tx: Fix x ∈ Rm and w = Tx ∈ R2m−1 the tree
representation of x. Let w′ = isPositiveR,2m−1(w) ∈ {0, 1}2m−1. Then, w′(k) = 1 if-and-only-if w(k) 6= 0,
where by the definition of tree representation, the latter holds if-and-only-if among the leaves rooted at (node
indexed by) k there is a leaf with non-zero key. uunionsq
Claim B.3 (Roots Sketch R ∈ {0, 1}m×(2m−1) with our suggested implementation in Lemma 3.5)
For every x ∈ Rm and w′ = iTx ∈ {0, 1}2m−1, v = Rw′ ∈ Rm satisfies that: (i) v ∈ {0, . . . , d}m for d = logm
the depth of the tree representation of x; (ii) the rows of R are d-sparse (i.e., each row has at most d non-zero
entries); and (iii) v(j) = 0 if-and-only-if
∑j
i=1 x(i) = 0.
Proof. The Roots Sketch R ∈ {0, 1}m×(2m−1): Let v = RiTx and fix an entry j ∈ [m]. To prove (i)-(ii),
observe that
|Siblings(j + 1)| ≤ d
because a leaf in a full binary with m = 2d leaves has at most d+1 ancestors, and at most d of them are left-
siblings, as the root is excluded. Now, since iTx(k) ∈ {0, 1} we conclude that v(j) = ∑k∈Siblings(j+1) iTx(k)
accepts values in {0, . . . , d}; and since the number of 1 entries in each row j ∈ [m] of R is |Siblings(j + 1)|
we conclude that R is d-sparse.
To prove (iii), first observer that
∑
k∈Siblings(j+1)
Tx(k) =
j∑
i=1
x(i)
because the left-siblings (corresponding to indexes) in Siblings(j + 1) partition the leaves x(1), . . . , x(j) into
disjoint sets (with a set for each left-sibling, containing all leaves x(i) for which the left-sibling is an ancestor),
and Tx(k) is the sum of values x(i) over all leaves for which that left-sibling (indexed by) k is an ancestor.
Next observe that by definition of the isPositive operator i(),∑
k∈Siblings(j+1)
Tx(k) 6= 0 if-and-only-if
∑
k∈Siblings(j+1)
iTx(k) 6= 0.
Finally, since v(j) =
∑
k∈Siblings(j+1) iTx(k), we conclude that v(j) 6= 0 if-and-only-if
∑j
i=1 x(i) 6= 0. uunionsq
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Claim B.4 (isPositive operator on v = RiTx) For every x ∈ Rm and v = RiTx, u = isPositiveR,m(v) ∈
{0, 1}m represents a step-function (0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1) whose first 1 value is at entry i∗, for i∗ the first positive
entry of x.
Proof. The isPositiveR,m operator applied on v = RiTx: Fix every v ∈ Rm. The vector u =
isPositiveR,m(v) ∈ {0, 1}m satisfies that u(j) = 1 if-and-only-if v(j) 6= 0. In particular, for v ∈ {0, . . . , d}
s.t. v(j) = 0 if-and-only-if
∑j
k=0 x(k) = 0, u(i) = 0 for all i < i
∗, and u(i) = 1 for all i ≥ i∗. uunionsq
Claim B.5 (Pairwise Sketch P ∈ {0, 1}m×m) For every u ∈ {0, 1}m representing a step function (0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1)
with 1 value at entry i∗, Pu ∈ {0, 1}m has a single non-zero entry at i∗.
Proof. Pairwise Sketch P ∈ {0, 1}m×m: Observe that Pu(i) = u(i) − u(i − 1) is the discrete derivative
of u, which is equal to zero on every entry i where u(i) = u(i − 1) and non-zero otherwise. For t a
vector representing a step-function with transition from 0 to 1 values at entry u(i∗) = 1, we get the value
Pu(i∗) = 1− 0 = 1 on i∗ and values Pu(i) = u(i)− u(i− 1) = 0 for all i 6= i∗. uunionsq
Claim B.6 (The Sketch S ∈ {0, 1}logm×m) For every 1-sparse t ∈ {0, 1}m, then St ∈ {0, 1}logm is the
binary representation of the index i∗ for the unique non-zero entry in t.
Proof. The Sketch S ∈ {0, 1}logm×m: Proof follows immediately from taking S to be a (1,m)-sketch. It is
easy to see that the specified matrix is indeed a (1,m)-sketch: Note that the first column of S is the binary
representations of 0, the next column is the binary representation of 1, and so forth, to the last column
specifying the binary representation of m. For t with a single non-zero entry at entry i∗, the product St is
simply the i∗-th column of S, which is in turn simply the binary representation of the index i∗. uunionsq
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